Skip to content
DM11AI TRUST & IT RISK PROTECTION
ProductsCase StudiesAbout UsContact
PTTalk to an expert
Carregando
DM11AI TRUST & IT RISK PROTECTION

ouvir. entender. resolver.

Trust to grow in the AI era. AI governance, IT GRC, cybersecurity and business continuity for companies that cannot stop.

Solutions

  • AI Trust
  • Governance, Risk & Compliance
  • Cybersecurity
  • Security Office
  • Business Continuity

Products

  • oitenta20®
  • Jigphish®
  • Ethical Hacker as a Service
  • DPO Backoffice®
  • All products

Company

  • About us
  • Case studies
  • FAQ
  • Contact

Contact

  • contato@dm11.com.br
  • +55 (11) 4837-5758
  • Av. Eng. Luís Carlos Berrini, 1140 – 7º andar, Brooklin, São Paulo/SP – CEP 04571-000

DM11 © 2026 · All rights reserved.

  • Privacy Policy
  • Cookies
  • Terms of use
  • Ethics and conduct
  • Anti-corruption

Gateways, PSPs and processors

Processing cards for others means answering for more than others do.

PCI DSS has a set of requirements that exists only for service providers, and an entire appendix for those hosting multiple customers in a shared environment. DM11 prepares your company for the right route, without discovering the real scope mid-assessment.

Find my routeTalk to a specialist

DM11 prepares your company. We are not a QSA and we do not issue RoC, AOC or certificates. Where a formal assessment is required, it is conducted by a partner QSA qualified by the PCI SSC.

Who runs the preparation

  • 17 years in information security and compliance
  • PCI DSS projects in payments, retail and hospitality
  • In-house penetration testing and vulnerability management
  • Experience with bank and Big Four audits

The question that decides everything

Are you a merchant, a service provider, or both?

The answer changes the set of requirements, how you validate and how often each routine runs. The standard defines a service provider as an entity that processes, stores or transmits card data on behalf of another entity, or that can impact the security of that data. Gateways, sub-acquirers, facilitators and processors sit there. And a company that sells directly and also processes for others carries both roles.

Carrying both roles is common

The standard covers this case: where the entity assessed is both merchant and service provider, the service-provider-only requirements apply to the part of the business that provides the service. In practice these are two scope tracks inside one assessment, and treating them as one is an expensive mistake.

Your customer will ask

Whoever hires you has to monitor your compliance status at least every twelve months and know which requirements are yours, which are theirs and which are shared. That is not curiosity: it is their own requirement, and the answer you give determines whether the contract moves.

Being on the list is not enough

Appearing on a card brand's list of compliant service providers helps your customer meet their annual monitoring duty. But the standard is explicit: as evidence of requirements you meet on their behalf, the listing is not sufficient. You are expected to hand over the AOC on request.

Without a structured programme

  • Customer due diligence stalling contracts for lack of an AOC and responsibility matrix
  • On-demand assessments from every customer, individually, throughout the year
  • Scope discovered during the assessment, when fixing it costs most
  • Service-provider-only requirements handled as if they were merchant ones
  • An AOC marked as a partial assessment, which customers read as incomplete coverage

With the programme in place

  • An AOC ready to hand over, with the service scope declared without caveats
  • A responsibility matrix that answers due diligence without a meeting
  • Semiannual and quarterly routines running as a calendar, not an emergency
  • Eligibility for card brand listings, which shortens your customers' validation
  • The ability to keep your own customers on the shortest questionnaire

What changes for a provider

The same standard, with obligations merchants do not carry

PCI DSS marks a series of requirements as applying only to service providers, and doubles the frequency of routines a merchant performs once a year. Anyone building the programme with a merchant mindset finds this out late.

Current version

PCI DSS v4.0.1, published in June 2024. Version 4.0 was retired in December 2024, making it the only active version. The Report on Compliance template is at revision 3, from January 2025.

The clock turned in March 2025

Most of the new requirements in version 4 were best practice until 31 March 2025 and became mandatory on that date. Several of them hit service providers hardest, especially the semiannual scoping ones and those in the shared environment appendix.

There is only one SAQ for providers

SAQ D for Service Providers is the only self-assessment option for a provider, and only for those a card brand deems eligible. It carries the provider-only requirements in full plus the shared environment appendix, neither of which exists in the merchant SAQ.

Scope confirmed every six months

A merchant confirms scope once a year. A provider confirms every six months and after any significant change. The standard's own reasoning is that provider networks are larger, more complex and change more often.

Semiannual segmentation testing

Where a merchant tests segmentation once a year, a provider tests every six months and after any change to segmentation controls. And whoever hosts multiple customers has a second test, additional to that one.

The alternative to an annual assessment is worse

The standard offers providers two options: run an annual assessment and give customers the evidence, or be assessed on demand by each customer and take part in each of their assessments. The second trades one project a year for a queue of them.

Which route is yours

Four routes, and what separates them

The route follows from how data flows, who you serve and the volume you handle on behalf of others. Thresholds and validation methods are set by the card brands and your acquirer, not by the PCI Security Standards Council.

Your profileValidation routeWhat it demands
Card data never touches your environmentSAQ AThe shortest set of controls. It does not apply to service providers: it is a merchant route.
Data passes through you, but you sell to your own end customersSAQ D MerchantThe full standard from a merchant's perspective, without the provider-only requirements.
You process, store or transmit on behalf of other companies, within the brand's thresholdSAQ D Service ProviderThe full standard, plus provider-only requirements, plus the shared environment appendix if you host multiple customers. It also requires describing test results per requirement, not just ticking yes or no.
Above the brand's threshold, or where your acquirer requires itReport on ComplianceA formal assessment conducted by a QSA, in the official template, with independent scope validation by the assessor. It is also the route to appearing on the card brands' compliant provider lists.

Visa publishes a threshold of 300,000 annual transactions separating Level 1 from Level 2 service providers, with a QSA Report on Compliance at Level 1 and self-assessment at Level 2. Quarterly external scanning by an approved vendor applies to both levels. Mastercard classifies by service category and annual volume under its own programme. Confirm your classification with your acquirer before choosing a route.

What applies only to you

Requirements that do not exist for merchants

The standard marks these as applying only to service providers. Anyone building a programme from generic PCI DSS material simply never finds them, and discovers the gap when the assessor asks.

3.6.1.1

Documented cryptographic architecture

A description of every algorithm, protocol and key protecting stored data, with strength and expiry, plus an inventory of cryptographic modules with type and location. And production keys cannot be reused in test environments.

3.7.9

Keys shared with customers

If you share cryptographic keys with the customers you serve, you must document and distribute guidance on secure transmission, storage and updating of those keys.

8.2.3

Unique credential per customer

If you access your customers' environments remotely, the authentication factor must be unique per customer. A credential used for one customer cannot work for another.

8.3.10.1

Customer-user passwords

Where a password is the only access factor for your customer's users to card data, either it changes every ninety days, or you dynamically analyse the account's security posture and decide access in real time.

11.4.6

Semiannual segmentation testing

Every six months and after any change to segmentation controls, confirming the card environment is isolated from all out-of-scope systems. The tester needs organisational independence, and need not be a QSA.

11.5.1.1

Covert malware channels

Intrusion detection must identify, alert on and address covert communication channels used by malware, and the incident response plan must cover responding to that detection.

12.4.1 and 12.4.2

Governance and quarterly reviews

Formal executive accountability for the programme, with a charter communicated to senior management. Plus reviews every three months confirming tasks are being performed per policy, carried out by people other than those performing the task.

12.5.2.1 and 12.5.3

Semiannual scope and organisational change

Scope confirmation every six months, and a documented impact review whenever there is a relevant change in company structure, such as a merger, acquisition or reassignment of control owners, with results communicated to senior management.

12.9.1 and 12.9.2

What you owe your customers

A written agreement acknowledging your responsibility for the security of data you hold on their behalf. And responding, on request, to enquiries about compliance status and about how responsibility is split per requirement.

Shared environment

The appendix that exists because of you

The standard deals separately with those offering shared services to multiple customers, with system resources, infrastructure, applications or databases in common. The text names gateway and processing services in shared environments explicitly. Providers offering only shared data centre space, the colocation model, fall outside this appendix.

Separation in both directions

The provider cannot access a customer's environment without authorisation, and a customer cannot access the provider's environment without authorisation. Each customer reaches only their own card data and consumes only the resources allocated to them, without impacting others.

A second semiannual pentest

The effectiveness of separation between customer environments is confirmed by penetration testing every six months. The standard is explicit that this test is additional to the segmentation pentest, not a replacement. They are two distinct exercises in the same half-year.

Per-customer logging, visible only to its owner

Logging enabled by default for each customer's environment, available for review only by the customer who owns it, with the log location clearly communicated to them.

Forensics and a reporting channel

The ability to support prompt forensic investigation for an incident affecting any customer, and a secure channel for customers to report incidents and vulnerabilities, with handling and remediation.

You cannot forbid customer pentests

Anyone running a shared environment must support their customers' external penetration testing. The standard says why, plainly: forbidding it would leave their systems open to exploitation.

Worth noting what the standard itself observes: even where the provider meets these requirements, each customer remains responsible for meeting and validating the requirements applicable to their own environment. Your compliance does not transfer compliance to those you serve, and promising that commercially creates a problem later.

What you hand your portfolio

Your integration model decides your customers' effort

Here is a competitive edge few exploit. How you deliver the payment page determines which self-assessment your merchant customers can use, and the gap between the shortest and the next one is large. This is a selling argument for your portfolio, and it is verifiable in PCI Security Standards Council material.

How you integrateYour customer's self-assessmentCondition
Full outsourcing, such as a payment link sent to the cardholderSAQ AThe script protection criterion does not apply to this model.
Redirect from the customer's site to your environmentSAQ AThe script criterion does not apply to redirects either, provided the other criteria are met.
Embedded page or form, typically via iframeSAQ AOnly if the customer protects the page themselves, or if you provide written confirmation that your solution, implemented per your instructions, protects the page against script attacks.
The customer's site controls the flow and affects the page's integritySAQ A-EPConsiderably broader. If you host the site and run a shared environment, meeting the multi-tenant appendix is a prerequisite for your customer's eligibility.
Card data reaches the customer's own siteSAQ D MerchantThe customer's environment comes into scope entirely.

The third row is the opportunity. A provider that implements script management and change detection in its own iframe solution, and issues the written confirmation, keeps its portfolio on the shortest self-assessment instead of pushing it to the next one. Those who do not, push. The final decision on which self-assessment applies always rests with the customer's acquirer or card brand.

Who does what

Everyone's limits, stated before you hire anyone

In a market where certificates get promised by people who cannot issue them, we would rather be clear from the start about who signs what. It changes what you should demand from us and what you need to solve elsewhere.

Your company
Signs the self-assessment where SAQ D-SP is the route, and signs the attestation on any route. You are also the one handing the AOC and responsibility matrix to your customers.
DM11
Prepares. We design and reduce the scope, implement the controls, write policies and the cryptographic architecture, build the semiannual and quarterly routines, run the segmentation pentest and organise the evidence. We are not a QSA and we do not issue RoC, AOC or certificates.
A partner QSA
Conducts the formal assessment and signs the Report on Compliance where that is your route. We work alongside them with separated roles: whoever prepared a control does not assess it.
An ASV
Runs the quarterly external vulnerability scan. Only companies approved by the PCI SSC may perform that validation scan, and it applies to service providers at any level.
Your acquirer and card brand
Define your level, your validation route and where the evidence goes. They also decide on the use of a customized approach. Classification questions go to them, not to the PCI SSC.

Self-assessment

Which PCI DSS is yours, and what is missing to get there

The first questions classify your case and point to a validation route. The rest walk through the chapters of the standard and show where the gaps are. The full result appears on screen, with the route, a score per chapter and what closes each gap. We do not ask for your email to show it.

ProfileQuestion 1 of 25

How does card data move through your operation?

How we run it

From scope to evidence the assessor accepts

Every phase ends with a deliverable. You know what you get before you start.

  1. 01

    Define the scope

    We map the data flow, the connected systems and those that can impact the environment's security. We separate the merchant track from the provider track where a company carries both roles, because treating them as one distorts everything downstream.

    You get

    • Flow map and network diagram
    • Declared scope, with what was excluded and why
    • Route classification to confirm with your acquirer
  2. 02

    Shrink the territory

    Before implementing controls, we remove what does not need to be in scope. Segmentation, eliminating unnecessary storage and revisiting integrations shrink the whole programme at once.

    You get

    • Scope reduction plan
    • Segmentation design
    • Estimated impact per chapter
  3. 03

    Close the gaps

    We work with your team on what is missing in each chapter, with particular attention to the provider-only requirements and the shared environment appendix, which are usually absent.

    You get

    • Controls implemented per chapter
    • Documented cryptographic architecture
    • Approved policies and procedures
  4. 04

    Build the routines

    Provider compliance is a calendar, not a project. We structure the quarterly reviews, the semiannual scope confirmation, the pentests at the correct frequency and the quarterly scanning.

    You get

    • Routine calendar with owners
    • Record template for each review
    • Segmentation pentest executed
  5. 05

    Prepare the customer relationship

    We build what your customers' due diligence will ask for: a responsibility matrix per requirement, the written responsibility agreement and the process for answering status requests.

    You get

    • Responsibility matrix
    • Customer agreement template
    • Due diligence response process
  6. 06

    Take it to assessment

    We organise the evidence in the format the assessor expects and run a dry run before the real assessment. Where the route is a Report on Compliance, we coordinate with the partner QSA, preserving the separation of roles.

    You get

    • Evidence file per requirement
    • Dry run with findings fixed beforehand
    • Support during the assessment

Stories

Four situations we have already solved

We anonymise our clients with the same confidentiality that will protect your company later. The names change, and the pattern of the problems repeats.

Payment gateway

Found out at the assessment that it was a service provider

Situation
The company built its programme from generic PCI DSS material and reached the assessment without the provider-only requirements. The documented cryptographic architecture, the quarterly execution reviews and the semiannual scope confirmation were all missing. The environment was sound; the programme was incomplete.
What we did
We went requirement by requirement separating what applied because it was a provider from what applied because it was a merchant, since the company carried both roles. Then we built the routines with a calendar and named owners, rather than treating them as one-off deliverables.
Outcome
The next assessment produced no finding tied to a provider requirement. The least expected gain was managerial: the board began receiving a quarterly summary that had not existed before.
Facilitator in a shared environment

One pentest where two were needed

Situation
The company ran the segmentation penetration test every six months and considered the matter settled. But it hosted dozens of customers on the same infrastructure, and separation between their environments requires its own test, additional to that one.
What we did
We separated the two exercises and designed the customer separation test, with simulated environments used to try reaching one customer from another. We also adjusted logging so each customer saw only their own environment.
Outcome
The gap closed before the assessment rather than during it. The separation test found a lateral path the segmentation test would not have caught, because it was looking at a different boundary.
Sub-acquirer

The due diligence that was stalling contracts

Situation
Every corporate customer sent its own questionnaire and asked for compliance evidence. With no responsibility matrix and an incomplete attestation, the sales team spent weeks per contract and some deals simply stopped.
What we did
We built the matrix splitting each requirement between the company and the customer, standardised the written responsibility agreement and structured the response process, with the material ready to send.
Outcome
Answering due diligence stopped being a project and became an attachment. Time to signature dropped noticeably, and sales stopped pulling the technical team in for every request.
Checkout provider

It was pushing its own portfolio onto the bigger questionnaire

Situation
The product delivered an embedded payment page, but without a script inventory or change detection. As a result, merchant customers could not sustain the shortest self-assessment and fell into the next one, considerably broader. Some began looking at competitors because of it.
What we did
We implemented script management and change detection in the solution itself, and structured the written confirmation customers need in order to sustain eligibility.
Outcome
What had been an objection became a selling point. The provider now offers, alongside the product, the document that reduces the compliance effort of whoever buys it.

Frequently asked

What people ask before deciding

Answers anchored in the PCI Security Standards Council's standard and the card brand programmes. Where no official figure exists, we say so.

No. DM11 is not a QSA and does not issue a Report on Compliance, attestation or certificate. We prepare: we design and reduce the scope, implement the controls, build the recurring routines, run the segmentation pentest and organise the evidence. Where your route requires a formal assessment, it is conducted by a qualified partner QSA, with roles separated between whoever prepared and whoever assesses.

More questions? Talk to DM11

Start by knowing which PCI DSS is yours

A thirty minute conversation is usually enough to separate what is a provider obligation, what is a merchant one, and which validation route applies to your case. No obligation.

Talk to a specialistTake the self-assessment